1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
3	FOR THE DISTRICT OF KNODE ISLAND
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6	YARON UNGAR, et al CA No. 00-105 L
7	
8	v PROVIDENCE, RI 22 AUGUST 2003
9	22 AUGUST 2003
10	PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, et al
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13	BEFORE MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID L. MARTIN
14	APPEARANCES:
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16	321 S. Main St.
17	Suite 400 Providence, RI 02903
18	351-7700
19	FOR THE DEFENDANT: RAMSEY CLARK, ESO.
20	LAWRENCE SCHILLING, ESQ.
21	Ramsey Clark & Lawrence Schilling Law Offices 36 East 12th Street
22	New York, NY 10003 1-212-475-3232
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24	DEMING SHERMAN, ESQ. OBJUSTED A DEMING SHERMODE ISTAND OBJUSTED SHERMAN, ESQ.
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22 AUGUST 2003

THE COURT: This is the matter of the Estate of Ungar, et al vs. The Palestinian Authority, et al, Civil Action $00-105\ L$.

Before the Court this morning are plaintiffs' motion for judgment by default pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) against The Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Also consideration of plaintiffs' attorney's fees in regard to defendants' failure to respond to discovery requests.

The attorneys will identify themselves.

MR. STRACHMAN: David Strachman for the plaintiffs.

MR. CLARK: Ramsey Clark with Deming Sherman and Larry Schilling for the defendant.

THE COURT: Before we begin the hearing, the Court wishes to place on the record some information as to how we come to this point.

On July 14, 2003, the Court conducted a hearing which considered plaintiffs' motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) for a judgment by default against defendant PA, and for other relief, which was filed on February 12, 2003. I refer to this motion as being plaintiffs' first motion for

default judgment.

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Also considered was plaintiffs' motion for judgment by default against PA and PLO, and for other relief for refusal to submit to depositions which was filed on April 9, 2003. I refer to this motion as plaintiffs' second motion for default judgment.

Prior to taking up those motions on July 14th, the Court asked counsel for plaintiffs if the filing of the third motion for default judgment, which is the motion that I have announced for hearing this morning, a motion which at the time of the July 14th hearing had not yet been referred to this Magistrate I asked Mr. Strachman if the filing of that Judge. motion made it unnecessary for the Court to rule upon the first two motions for default judgment. recollection is that Mr. Strachman responded no, that the matter could move on parallel tracks, and the Court, upon reflection, agreed with that assessment and denied the defendants' motion for a continuance of the hearing, and heard argument on plaintiffs' first and second motions for default judgment.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court stated that it would take the matters under advisement and issue a Report & Recommendation.

On July 22, 2003, the Court received a

letter from plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Strachman. In the letter, plaintiffs request that to the extent the Report & Recommendation on the first and second motions for default judgment addresses the matter of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiffs requested that the Court consider documentation which plaintiffs had submitted as part of plaintiffs' third motion for default judgment.

The very next day, July 23, 2003, Judge Lagueux referred plaintiffs' third motion for default judgment to this Magistrate Judge for a Report & Recommendation.

In light of the request contained in Mr. Strachman's letter of July 23rd -- I may have the date wrong because I received the letter on July 22nd. I'm referring to the letter I received from Mr. Strachman on July 22, 2003. In light of that letter, and the referral of plaintiffs' third motion for default judgment, the Court wrote to counsel on July 25, 2003, stating that in light of these developments, the Court would conduct a hearing on plaintiffs' third motion for default judgment on August 15th, and then write a single Report & Recommendation which addressed all three motions for default judgment.

Mr. Schilling wrote to the Court on July 28,

2003 stating that Mr. Clark was unavailable on August 15, 2003, and requested that the hearing be scheduled for a date after August 20th. Mr. Strachman objected to a delay and suggested an earlier date of July 30th. The Court subsequently responded to counsel that the hearing would be held today, indicating that the date suggested by Mr. Strachman of July 30th was not available for the Court.

I simply wanted to place that on the record, gentlemen, to explain how we are convening again for another hearing after I had announced at the last hearing that I would be writing a Report & Recommendation which would address the first two motions for default judgment.

Having placed that on the record, I'll now take up -- we'll proceed this morning first with the hearing on the motion which I have identified as being plaintiffs' third motion for default judgment. We'll hear argument on that, then we'll take up the matter of the attorneys' fees that are also scheduled for consideration this morning.

Before I do that, the defendants,
Palestinian defendants, have filed a motion to exceed
page limits for exhibits. The defendants filed an
opposition to this motion which we are hearing this

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morning, in their memorandum referenced some exhibits which were not attached, and the Court was subsequently informed that the reason they were not attached is they exceeded the page limits, which the Court had established, but which can be waived upon motion when granted by the Court.

Mr. Strachman, did you want to be heard on their request to exceed the page limit?

MR. STRACHMAN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The Court will grant the Palestinian defendants' motion to exceed page limit for exhibits and will consider the exhibits which they have submitted in connection with their memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs' third motion for default judgment.

All right, with that, I'll hear from Mr. Strachman on the plaintiffs' third motion for default judgment.

MR. STRACHMAN: Your Honor, in light of the totality of the proceedings in this matter, and especially Judge Lagueux's directives on July 30th where he indicated very clearly that the only thing left in this case is really the assessment of damages against the Palestinian defendants. Plaintiffs wrote to the defendants. A copy of a letter to them was

attached to documents which we delivered to the Court 1 yesterday. That letter of mine was July 28, 2003, 2 suggesting that in order to relieve the Court of having 3 to determine whether the defendants have the right to 4 cross-examine, or examine the witnesses that were 5 presented last June, that we would extend the 6 opportunity even without suggesting that they have the 7 right to, we gave them the opportunity to depose, 8 cross-examine in Israel, in America, via telephone, any 9 method of their choosing, during the month of August. 10 We received a letter the very next day from 11 Mr. Schilling indicating that he would bring the matter 12 up immediately with Mr. Clark, and we have not heard 13 since whether they choose to do so. So, therefore, we 14 would like to very simply suggest to the Court that the 15 present motion which was filed prior to your Honor's 16 July 3 Report & Recommendation concerning damages on 17 Hamas, be simply applied here. I think, so it goes 18 without saying, but just to be clear, I'll say it, the 19 motion that we filed that's before the Court today, we 20 referenced all the documents, the damage memo, the 21 post-trial briefs, et cetera. A month later your Honor 22 rendered a decision, so we would ask that we simply 23 apply that damage calculation to the present case. 24

We have not received a substantive response

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from the defendants. It's almost 30 days since I wrote the letter to them making my clients and the witnesses available to them. So, therefore, I respectfully request that the Court pose to them the question today, do they want to present evidence in the form of cross-examination or in the form of, you know, recalling, if you will, our witnesses. And, if not, I think that should end the matter. And, therefore, bsaed on what we've written in our briefs, very clearly the Court has personal jurisdiction.

I think it's very clear who Mr. Rockman is.

He held himself out very clearly in his own biography as the PA representative, as well as the PLO representative. The Court clearly has subject matter jurisdiction over this case, and I think it's sort of a fairly simple exercise at this point, having been defaulted on three different grounds, having Judge Lagueux last month -- the hearing was on July 30, I believe, approving your Report & Recommendation concerning the default on each of those grounds. So I think the matter now is simply to, you know, enter final judgment and use the damage calculation previously utilized.

We stress that the virtual identical documents that were submitted to the Court previously

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concerning the second, I believe, motion to dismiss, should be utilized in this case to establish the preponderance of the evidence concerning personal iurisdiction. There is no contradiction at all provided to any document that we provided with the exception of Mr. Rahman's own declaration which we provided to the Court in support of our motion. Mr. Rahman's declaration indicates that he is not a representative to the PA, and he does that even though his own biography indicates otherwise. If the Court would note at the very top of the document, the biography, it is very clear that the fax number that it came from, although it's cut off somewhat, the fax number came from the PLO and PA office in Washington. THE COURT: Mr. Strachman, which exhibit are you referring to, please? MR. STRACHMAN: I'm referring to Exhibit B. THE COURT: You're saying there's a fax number on this document somewhere? MR. STRACHMAN: At the very top, your Honor, there is an indication of the date and the time -- it is cut off, but the fax number can clearly be made out, at least in part. And if the Court turns to Mr. Rahman's very own declaration to the Court, which we presented as Exhibit M, the Court will note on the

very first page, at the very top, that the numbers are identical, indicating --

THE COURT: Mr. Strachman, I'm going to have my clerk show you my copy of the biography, Exhibit B, and you tell me, or point out on that page where is the fax number you are referring to.

MR. STRACHMAN: I'm sort of confused, Judge. The words that we have are a little different so, if I could, present to the Court --

THE COURT: Would you show that document, however, to opposing counsel first?

MR. STRACHMAN: I believe they have the exact (coughing) your Honor, because it was attached to all the other documents. And it always has, Judge.

And it's cut off, (inaudible). And there's a little telephone symbol next to the fax number. And if your Honor turns to Exhibit M, toward the very top, and that's Mr. Rahman's declaration that was provided by the defendants in their motion, the numbers are identical. Even if we didn't have that, Judge, what we have is in the documents that we provided to the Court yesterday, for instance, which are eight documents, six of which indicate very clearly that Mr. Rahman holds himself out as working for the PA and, in fact, testified in Congress before the Senate that his role

was a dual role, both the Chief of the PLO in the United States and the PA.

And lastly, in regard to that issue, Judge, because -- and I raise this because these are the objections. There are basically two objections provided to us Wednesday evening in the defendants' response to our motion. And they raise issues about his own biography and his own -- and his representations about who he is and who he works for, but what's interesting is they don't come out and say "this is not his biography. We have no where from Mr. Rahman indicating that this is a fabrication, or was made up, or he never used this."

And, in fact, what's interesting, and one of the reasons we provided to the Court all of the other interviews with ABC, NBC, CNN, et cetera, is because all of these representations about Mr. Rahman in many cases quote directly from his own biography. And there are dozens more. And it's very clear who he works for, what he does. And with that, your Honor, I think I will rest.

THE COURT: Mr. Strachman, do you want to say anything in response to the argument made by the defendants in their memorandum, at the bottom of page 5 and the top of page 6 of their memorandum, referring to

the Klinghoffer decision in where the Court in Klinghoffer said that -- let me read from defendants' memorandum. "In Klinghoffer, in actions against the PLO commenced after its effective date. The statute was found to deprive plaintiffs of the 'benefit of a presumption of continuity' of PLO activities bearing on personal jurisdiction. See Klinghoffer, 795 F.Supp. 115, warranting dismissal of the actions for lack of personal jurisdiction."

I gather from the memorandum, the argument the defendants are making is that the plaintiffs in this case are asking the Court to find, or infer, that there's been a continuity that, in fact, the Court in the Klinghoffer case in the opinion just quoted from, rejected. Do you want to respond to that?

MR. STRACHMAN: Part of the continuity, and part of the difference, your Honor, is that in 1994, the President allowed the PLO to operate freely in the United States, and they lifted any restrictions concerning the PLO. And I have a copy of the Presidential determination, if I could submit to the Court and to the defendants, and this declaration, your Honor, (not at the microphone) indicates clearly that the PLO has the right to operate without any of the restrictions that were -- that they were bound by prior

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And that is, to the best of my knowledge, that has been continued every 6 month period since I'm sort of surprised to see that representation 1994. in the defendants' brief because this statute obviates any issue there. We know they have tremendous systematic activities in the United States. It's been proven in all the other documents that we have in this court -- that we've shown in this court previously. Funds, the fund raising, the hiring of law firms for pension benefits, the hiring of press people, and representative such as Mr. Abbington, et cetera, the propaganda or informational activities of Mr. Rahman, Mr. Jilani, and others, indicating that they are very present in the United States, the renting of offices, the deposits, in at least, I believe, four banks, of at least \$18 million, the lawsuits that they participate in, in this country. I would also ask, Judge, respectfully, and I

I would also ask, Judge, respectfully, and I know there was an issue, you know, in New York the prior week, but we received their brief Wednesday evening. I'd like to have a short opportunity until next Friday to file a reply and maybe address in more particular some of these issues.

THE COURT: It is true that the defendants' objection was received a date later than what the Court

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specified, although I find there was a valid
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     explanation because of the electrical failure that
     affected the northeastern part of much of this country.
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     I'll grant your request. You may file a brief reply
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     not later than next Friday, Mr. Strachman.
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                                                 Thank you.
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     Have you completed your remarks?
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                MR. STRACHMAN: Yes, your Honor. If I could
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     just ask, in terms of that brief to not delay if we
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    were to exceed 10 pages, could we include in the order
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     that we would have a right to exceed that? We'd like
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     to provide some exhibits, as well, and I don't want to
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     file it and then make a request. That might take a
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     couple of days to grant.
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                THE COURT: If you contact my clerk
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    Miss Saucier that you are filing the response and it
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    exceeds the page limit, you prepare a motion so
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     requesting and I'll grant it.
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                MR. STRACHMAN: Thank you.
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                THE COURT: It doesn't have to be elaborate.
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     It can be a one-page motion. You request permission,
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     and just get it to my clerk and I'll grant it.
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                MR. STRACHMAN:
                                Thank you.
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                THE COURT: Mr. Clark, are you going to
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     argue for the defendants this morning?
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                MR. CLARK: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
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I'll address this last issue first while I have it in mind, since it just came up.

My understanding is that the PLO has authorized only one office in the United States, and that under the Foreign Missions Act, and it is called a Mission. It's PLO and it's not PNA. And it's severely circumscribed. It does require 6 month renewals.

We would ask leave to respond to any additional materials or argument on that subject that were submitted by the plaintiffs, and ask for the same amount of time to respond to what they present, that they have been given to make their presentation.

THE COURT: I have to say, Mr. Clark, I'm a little reluctant to grant that request simply because there has to be an end to this at some point. We have plaintiffs' third motion for default judgment. The defendants have filed an objection. It was filed a few days beyond the date that I specified. And Mr. Strachman's request for some additional time to respond, struck me as not unreasonable under the circumstances. Had the memorandum been filed on the date I specified, I would not be inclined to allow him to file another response believing that he had enough time to prepare and make his response this morning.

I'm allowing him to do so because I think his time was

constricted. Your request that you now be allowed to file a response to his further response raises the prospect that Mr. Strachman will then say that he wants to file another response. So I'm a little reluctant to start down this path.

MR. CLARK: Well, this came up when the Court asked a good question, and he presented a document that he had in his hand, or at least on the desk. We had no prior notice of it, and we don't know what he's going to present now. To have no opportunity to respond to it would seem not only highly prejudicial but ultimately error. But that's --

THE COURT: Well, let me make a ruling on this. You're requesting that you be allowed to file a response to Mr. Strachman's further response that is due -- his is due next Friday. All right, Mr. Clark, I'm going to grant that request but here's the limits on it. It's not to exceed 5 pages, and I'm really not looking for any exhibits. If it's absolutely necessary, 5 pages of exhibits. And it will be due one week from after Mr. Strachman's response.

Miss Saucier, what's the date next Friday? Is that the 29th?

THE CLERK: Yes, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, so Mr. Strachman's

response is due on August 29th, and the defendants' response, if they wish to file one, to Mr. Strachman's, will be due one week later. What date is that, please?

THE CLERK: September 5th.

THE COURT: September 5th.

MR. CLARK: We appreciate that, your Honor. There is one other matter that's related to that. He may proffer documents to which we may need to proffer other documents, so we'd like also leave to proffer those documents over and above our 5 page limitation.

THE COURT: Mr. Clark, you can make that request. I can tell you it will be very difficult to persuade me to grant that request, but I won't prohibit you from making it. I've set the limits, and if you want to, at the time, file a request to exceed those limits, you may do so. But I'm telling you now, I'm strongly inclined to adhere to the limits that I've set for the reasons I've stated. We need to have this matter come to a conclusion, and if each side keeps filing further responses, it won't come to a conclusion. So, I won't prohibit you from making a request to exceed the limits I just set, but I'm giving you fair warning you face an extremely difficult prospect of persuading me that I should exceed those. So, let's get on with the argument.

MR. CLARK: I'm just going to make a couple of observations about the situation in which the defendants find themselves.

They have urged heretofore on the Court the impossibility of defending under present circumstances. Reading the New York tabloid headlines at Penn Station this morning, and not believing that there are degrees of impossibility, I say, if anything, the papers today suggest that it's tragically been nothing that the PLO or the PNA ever wanted more impossible than ever to comply.

While we're technically on the third motion for default, which is something of a mystery in itself as to why there should be and why we should be forced to answer three separate motions for default, on the issue of failure to answer, our presentation before suggested that answering would serve no purpose even if it could readily be done because we could not then defend the case. We could not then go forward with discovery because of the chaos and violence in which the defendants live in their own land.

We also regret not having had the opportunity to exhaust the issue of immunity before going forward.

Now, on where we are today, let me say that

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there are two affidavits, not one, before the Court, that under penalty of perjury state that there is no PNA office in the United States, that there are many reasons, in law and otherwise, that there are not, going back as far as 1993, in the Oslo Accords which were signed in Washington. The PNA has been prohibited, as it is under the roadmap, the current, if it's still going on, effort to resolve this generation's-long conflict. The PNA is not authorized to have an office in the United States, and does not have one. And both Mr. Jilani, who is the deputy permanent observer of Palestine at the United Nations, since 1988, as I recall, the original observer office was PLO, but as progress toward peace was made in those years, the United Nations changed the nature of the It is no longer PLO. PLO has not only been office. removed from the title, it's been removed from the office. It's an office that represents the Palestinian people, and Palestine, in the expectation that the next step will be membership in the United Nations for Palestine.

Mr. Abbda Rahman, Rahman means power, or the most merciful in Arabic, and for Muslims it's been bad taste to say someone's name is Rahman. Abbda means servant of. So the two always go together as a name

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that means servant of God, not God. But he has given It's before this Court. It's the only an affidavit. conscious formal statement under penalties of perjury that is made before this Court in which he says that he does not represent the PNA, and could not represent the That doesn't mean he can't state the position of the PNA or the Russian federation, or Cambodia. Ιt just means that he's not the PNA or a representative of the PNA, and wouldn't be a part of the mission that's authorized under the Foreign Missions Act of the United States of the PLO in Washington, if he were a member, a representative of the PNA. So all the statements with Geraldo Rivera and the New York Times and his purported biography, this one page statement, is to Abbda Rahman's background, that don't make him a representative of the PNA, and do not overcome, or begin to overcome the weight of a sworn statement under penalties of perjury, that he is not such a member, that he's not such a representative.

THE COURT: Mr. Clark, I've read your memoranda, and I thought about that fact that this is an affidavit, or declaration, which is executed by Mr. Abbdal Rahman, and he says it's under penalty of perjury, and that I have that on the defendants' side. And on the plaintiffs' side there are news media

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documents where I believe he is identified as being a representative of the PNA, and the defendants argue that he is not responsible for this, in essence. It's not out of his mouth, these are what other people are saying. That's the argument you're making, or one of the arguments you make, am I correct?

MR. CLARK: Yes, that's correct. I don't -if I tried to list all the things I've been called, or
been introduced, polite and impolite, we'd be here all
day. They introduce him in a way that gives their
program the highest level of interest, so they
overstate it, but he is not, and they can't make him
so, and his own statement that he is so can't make him

THE COURT: Has he ever corrected this misidentification that apparently has happened on a number of occasions that you're aware of? Was there ever a letter to the editor saying that in the interview that you published of me yesterday I'm described as being a representative of the PNA and want to make clear I am not? Is there any knowledge that he's ever done that?

MR. CLARK: I don't know of any. I'd be somewhat surprised. But I think in the world of international diplomacy, and with the great difficulty

that Palestine has in getting its message out, which is a minor way to put it, that any accreditation anybody wants to give you, whether it's true or false, that makes it seem that there is a Palestine and it is speaking out, is helpful to the cause. That may sound lacking in candor or (inaudible) somehow or other, but it doesn't make him a representative of the PNA. If the United States Government thought he was a representative of the PNA, he'd be out of business. The same would be true at the United Nations. It's very clear at the United Nations that the PNA is not represented there by Al Kidwar, Ambassador Kidwar, nor is the PLO, nor can you be served there.

So on the subject of service, there's no service on the PNA. There's no valid service at the United States mission office. There's a disputed fact as to whether there was service on Abdal Rahman at the Washington office, but there could not have been service there on him or anybody else, on the PNA, because there is no one there who could accept service for the PNA, and there's considerable doubt under the Foreign Missions Act as to whether you can serve the chief official of the Mission for the purposes of domestic litigation between the United States.

So, you know, it may be, as Judge Lagueux

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found, if the standard, and as your Honor used in a default in Hamas, and in the damages in Hamas, if prima facie is the standard which all inferences go in favor of (inaudible) and you may have law of the case anyway,

THE COURT: I'm sorry, the last --

MR. CLARK: You may have law of the case, anyway, Judge Lagueux having decided way back on the 12(b)(1) motion that there was service and there were minimum contacts. On minimum contacts, there's really no evidence before you that goes beyond, as far as I can tell, the Klinghoffer case. And not only was Klinghoffer before the magic date you refer to in 1988, but the restrictions on -- well, they fluctuate. restrictions on what the Mission can do are as tight now as they've ever been. So the idea that their activities, they're not part of the Mission's proper conduct, which we submit includes talking to the public and talking to the press about the Mission's work, every other Mission does it, and I think the Mission of Palestine has that equal right. It's been minimal under any circumstances. Travel is extremely difficult for them. Just getting in and out of the country is extremely difficult. Not because of the UN, because under the (inaudible) agreement they have a right to

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come in and out, but because of the difficulties with the United States which superimposes visa notification and granting requirements that make it all very difficult for them.

So that minimum contacts can't be proved by an assumption of continuity. And you'll recall that in Klinghoffer, Judge Stanton ruled that if there was such a presumption, it was cut off by the ATA. So there's neither service nor minimum contacts that can be established against the PNA because it's not here, has no agent for service. There's been no service on any agent, or against the PLO because of the questions about service. When you read Abda Rahman's affidavit on that issue, you see that he's in direct conflict with the process server. But, in addition, to not being a representative of the PNA, as a head of the Mission under the Foreign Missions Act, there's a serious question as to whether he can even be served while he's acting in that capacity. That's basically our submission.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Clark, before you sit down, what is your position regarding the offer by the plaintiffs that the defendants be allowed to depose the persons who testified at the damages hearing involving Hamas? Mr. Strachman indicates that that

letter?

offer was made to the defendants in a letter some, I guess, 3 weeks ago. Is that right, Mr. Strachman, about 3 weeks ago?

MR. STRACHMAN: A little bit more, but I think a copy of it, Judge, was July 28th. A copy was submitted to the Court yesterday in the package that we delivered.

THE COURT: The first question, have you responded to that letter?

MR. CLARK: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you intend to respond to the

MR. CLARK: Well, we can respond right now. I was in El Salvador at the time. I came back in over the weekend and left for Europe, and out of courtesy, we should have responded. But I think the response is manifest. We did not participate in the hearing on default and damages for Hamas, and we do not intend to participate. Our instructions have been that we would not participate. We informed this Court on April 1st that those were our instructions, and it's been reinformed a couple of times. So it ought to be pretty clear that as gracious as the offer seems, it was a meaningless offer. And while courtesy would indicate that you respond to a meaningless offer, the

circumstances didn't warrant it until it was too late.
But we do not seek to examine any of their witnesses if
they appear and if they don't appear, because our
instructions are that we should not participate in the
proceedings until there's been a final decision on
immunity.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Clark. Thank you for that candid statement. We'll now proceed to the matter of the attorney's fees. In compliance with the Court's directives, Mr. Strachman submitted documentation in support of his request for attorney's fees. Mr. Strachman, is there anything further you wish to add to that list?

MR. STRACHMAN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Clark, does the defense wish to offer any argument regarding the request for attorney's fees?

MR. CLARK: Your Honor, I'm initially puzzled about the reason for addressing attorney's fees piecemeal under the statute on which the action is brought.

THE COURT: Your perhaps suggesting that if the Court goes ahead and -- you aren't suggesting this, but there's an alternative thought that if the Court goes ahead and enters default judgment, the plaintiffs'

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are entitled to attorney's fees, and presumably the attorney's fees would encompass these attorney's fees. Is that what you have in mind?

MR. CLARK: It would be subsumed in the overall attorney's fees, or I assume you wouldn't grant the same fees twice, for the same act. So I was puzzled.

THE COURT: Well, it's a point that after the fact occurred to the Court, quite frankly, Mr. Clark. The reason the Court put it down was because I had stated that I would be addressing it at past hearings, and on at least once, if not twice, I neglected to do so, and the Court became concerned that the matter was rapidly fading in the past and would not be addressed. And also, I have to say there's no guarantee that the Court will actually find in favor of the plaintiffs. But apart from that, the Court made an independent judgment that as to what has happened in the past, defendants' conduct was sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to attorney's fees. So even if the Court were to be persuaded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the default judgment they seek, and are not entitled to attorney's fees for this entire action, as opposed to this part of the action, the Court's already made a determination that they're entitled to

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attorney's fees. That was the Court's thinking, but I recognize if it comes out the other way, yes, they are subsumed. But the Court felt it did not want more time to pass without having these attorney's fees at least considered at a hearing, and I recognize they may be subsumed within the larger request for attorney's fees, but that's why we're hearing it this morning.

MR. CLARK: There's an application in the First Circuit on the interlocutory appeal for attorney's fees. I don't remember the amount, several thousand dollars, or something like that, and costs, and the attorney's fees, and you recall the decision of the First Circuit. The decision on attorney's fees was to deny them. And I (inaudible) speculate about the reasons, but when you just look at the amount of the awards in Hamas, and consider the psychological impact on the people of Palestine who don't make on the average a thousand dollars a year, it's very difficult to believe that anything except the United States is seeking to destroy their economic survival because they're at the survival level. A thousand dollars was before the last two years. No telling what it is now. Even in Israel, where it's been 16,000, it's down quite But the disparity creates part of the psychological environment. They can't understand that

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we're used to doing this. I say we're used to doing this. I have never asked for attorney's fees except as a final award, and I've never asked for sanctions in 54 years, because I don't really believe that. I think a gentleman can practice law (inaudible). I realize that that's a point of view these days.

Another thing that's strange about it is, in the real sense, the default has not added work, it's reduced work. It will end the case quicker. It will end it with a lot less expenditure. And we've never understood why, after the date in February in which this motion that we have before us today on failure to answer, which began back in November of last year, perhaps, perhaps December, addressing our failure to answer, why it hadn't been brought on. And then the triple path toward default. Now I just saw this thing yesterday, their itemization of fees, and it didn't appear to me immediately that it includes basic time, or substantial time on the other two motions for default, but that imposed work on us, you could say, on the same related issue, that it imposed travel here. We've been up here several times because of three motions, whereas if it'd just been one motion for default, which is all I've ever seen in a case, that could have spared us that. But I think considering the

course of litigation, which has been long, but the great bulk of the time was spent in reaching a decision on who the plaintiffs were and who the defendants were. The plaintiffs were cut in half and the defendants were cut 9 to 2, discovery only began in November of last year, and from a very early time, and certainly after I was in Ramallah in mid-December, I was trying to make it clear that the only thing we were going to be able to do was seek to establish immunity because we could not defend the case. And under those circumstances, I think the award of attorney's fees for what's been going on would be unfair.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Clark.

MR. CLARK: Thank you, sir.

MR. STRACHMAN: May I respond?

THE COURT: Briefly, Mr. Strachman, yes.

MR. STRACHMAN: I'm sort of shocked, Judge, to learn that the failure of the defendants to follow the Court orders and to fight and to appeal every order and to ask for protective orders and to seek to reconsider discovery orders all following Mr. Clark's communication with Mr. Araft, as he disclosed in April. If he had taken a different course, if the defendants had taken a different course, we might not have been here. But the numerous hours that we've spent on this

case for the last 9 months were all caused because of one party. We wrote the letter saying how can we resolve the disputes. We took a month to do an order following the December 12th hearing so that we could negotiate virtually every single word, and to hear that 9 months later that this is, in a sense, the plaintiffs' doing, and to add insult to injury, that they've actually made it easier for us by defaulting, is sort of shocking.

I would ask your Honor to rule on this request either today, or to take it under advisement, but to deal with it independent of the ultimate decision in terms of a default judgment. I think it's important to keep the record very clear as to the occurrences in this case and to the attorney's fees as a compensation or sanction for defendants' actions, and to ensure that each of the issues are dealt with very precisely to avoid any complications in the future. Thank you.

THE COURT: You're suggesting, perhaps,

Mr. Strachman, that, hypothetically speaking, if I were
to issue a Report & Recommendation recommending that
default judgment enter in favor of the plaintiffs, it's
accepted by Judge Lagueux, then on appeal to the First
Circuit it were reversed, and attorney's fees had been

awarded as part of the default judgment, that the fact that even apart from the reversal of the default judgment, the Court made an independent determination that you were entitled to attorney's fees in connection with these discovery problems the plaintiffs encountered, that that should be clear, that you'd at least have that. Do you follow my analysis?

MR. STRACHMAN: I think you may have thought it through a little more than I have, your Honor. But what's concern to us, what's of concern to us, is that the procedural morass of this case caused because of all of these tactics and strategies and methodologies used by the defendants have clogged this case up, and I think it's just extremely important to be, for us, and we've tried as much as possible, and that's why we offered in terms of taking depositions or taking testimony, to be very simplistic in a sense as to each step along the way. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you,

Counsellor. All right. As I've indicated, the

plaintiffs, Mr. Strachman, has one week to file a

further response to the objection that the defendants

have filed to the plaintiffs' third motion for default

judgment. The defendants, one week thereafter, have

the Court's permission to file a reply to that

response, not to exceed 5 pages in length, exhibits not to exceed 5 pages. Defendants are allowed to ask the Court to exceed that limitation. I've indicated it would take a lot to persuade me to authorize that limitation to be exceeded. I will take these matters under advisement. I will issue a single Report & Recommendation which addresses all 3 pending motions for entry of default judgment against defendants. I will issue a separate opinion regarding the attorney's fees. That will conclude the hearing. The Court will stand in recess.

CERTIFICATION

I, court approved transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

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